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Visions of an exceptional land and an exceptional nation that 
incarnates liberty,, progress, glory, and compels instinctive allegiance 
have long been a force in France. Yet, as the 20th century lurched and 
blundered on, the pride became more anxious, the glory more dubious, 
the progress insufficient or unsatisfying, the brilliant identity more 
threatened. The French have reacted, as folk in such straits will, by a 
fever of introspection. Self-satisfied solipsism has turned nervous and 
critical; and Pierre Birnbaum's France Imagined was part of a copious 
fallout. It is also part of a current cottage industry that explores the 
nature and manufacture of national identities. 
Few nations, Birnbaum tells us in his preface, "are more 
preoccupied by historical memory, by the permanent rereading of 
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their past". But (here's his twist) the past that the French have in 
common is one of conflict and contention, always bickery and often 
bloody. French congruence, he argues, is based on a blistering 
community of cross purposes, discord, factiousness and violence. Can 
"the old passions for murderous contradiction" give way to plurality, 
tolerance and respect of differences? We shall come to that in a 
moment. 
To begin with, the book etches a confrontational society, 
repeatedly torn by the clash of radically opposed principles: a 
succession of ruptures that have done little to advance tolerance, 
internal diversity, or liberalism. There were Jews in France, for 
example, before there were Franks. But St. Louis made them wear a 
special badge of infamy, forerunner of Hitler's yellow star; and, in 
1182, St. Louis's successors made theirs the first country to banish its 
Jews, long before England, Spain or Portugal followed suit. Four 
hundred years later, the St. Bartholomew's Day massacre sent ten 
thousand Protestants to meet their God, and ushered in twenty years of 
religious wars. The strife that Henri IV appeased was reopened in 
1685 by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, which condemned over 
200.000 Huguenots to exile, and others to revolt. Then came the 
French Revolution, more internal conflict, and more searing 
memories. 
In quest of the unanimity that it never ceased proclaiming, the 
Revolution spurred exclusion and extermination. A manichean 
exercise, painting all in black and white, made sure that national 
predispositions would be fed on conflict and on cant. The Place de la 
Concorde where Louis XVI was beheaded along with many others, 
reflects the triumph of wishful euphemism: the abattoir of the 
guillotine proclaimed a site of concord. 
As Tocqueville observed when he wrote the history of those times, 
it's easier to remain constant in hatred than affection; rancor still 
stokes the fires of memory. Tocqueville is Birnbaum's first witness 
for the prosecution of "a society that fed to an unusual degree on 
hatred". The 19th century liberal was struck by "a society ruled by 
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inexpiable hatreds", by provinces experiencing a "permanent" war, by 
local civil wars where "hatred of one's neighbor is stronger than 
hatred of the master"; and where for generations "fiercely hostile 
clans" frequenting each its own grocer, butcher, ballroom, bistro, 
school, "have sworn eternal hatred for each other". 
Birnbaum too is struck by habits of the heart that turn so much of 
life, let alone politics, into confrontations of true believers inspired by 
different dreams that color different mental worlds. Two ways of 
imagining society, two ways of imagining the nation and its 
personality, confront each other. In the name of reason and faith 
respectively, says Birnbaum. Why not in the name of rival faiths, 
comforted by rival local or family traditions? In the Revolution two 
great beliefs opposed each other: the religion of the sovereign people 
and that of the sovereign Christ: the church of the Republic promising 
salvation here on earth challenged the church of Rome, denounced as 
the Right at prayer. Each functioned as inspiration and as bond 
(religio) for rival parties. 
Birnbaum, who begins his survey in the Vendee, quotes Maurice 
Agulhon about the war of religions that long marked life in France. He 
also dedicates a chapter to Joseph de Maistre, devotee of the martyred 
king and of Christ the King, who "assigned hatred a special place 
among human sentiments"; but, in one respect, he gets Maistre wrong. 
The violence of Maistre's reactionary beliefs was the antithesis not of 
revolutionary exclusivism (which his own passion matched), but of 
the liberal tolerance of Tocqueville. Like Robespierre and Marat, 
Maistre the intolerant fanatic declared fanaticism and intolerance 
"ingredients necessary to French greatness". He excommunicated 
revolutionaries as heretics, that is as wrongheaded rival religionists. 
That was why Maistre loathed them, and loathing loomed large in his 
vocabulary too: hatred of revolution, of course, but also of Protestants, 
of Voltaire, of enemies of religion (meaning his brand of religion), 
and of monarchy. He praised salutary hatreds: that of Louis XIV for 
Huguenots, that of Fenelon against Jansenists and, more generally, 
that bracing kind of hatred "that is certainly French and politically 
good". 
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To go no further back than the revolutionary watershed whose 
violences were stoked by anterior aversions, hatred was one gift that a 
malevolent fairy left in the cradle of a newly-sovereign folk. But let us 
not forget what Tocqueville called "the democratic disease of envy", 
with all the "base jealousy and thoughtless mischief that follow in its 
train. And the equally democratic pretentions that left their mark on 
manners, and on economy too. Voltaire had praised an England where 
trade kept people from flying at each other's throats, Montesquieu 
equated commerce and civility, Tocqueville praised Americans more 
interested in making money than in political squabbles. But it was 
Napoleon's dismissal of England as a nation of shopkeepers that went 
straight to French hearts. 
The Revolution was against privilege; its success was taken to 
mean that there would be privileges for everybody. And honor. 
Equality asserted, at least in principle, meant that service, with its 
demeaning overtones, would be tendered grudgingly and with 
reluctance. Once the preserve of a privileged class, arrogance and 
condescension would be paraded by all who could reach that far; 
shopkeepers approached clients with curled lip, counter-jumpers 
challenged unforthcoming customers to duel, all who could afford it 
dreamed of living nobly, shunned menial trade for investment income, 
fled grubby money-making for the more honorable conditions of a 
country estate. The emphasis on quality against quantity, artisanry 
against mass production, skill against sales and service, made for 
more elegant handiwork, more relaxed living and, sometimes, more 
cultivated minds. But it also fueled spite of comforts and affectations 
unfounded on traditional convention. Tocqueville again, in 1847: 
"indifference will give way to envy and hatred. Future danger: class 
war". 
Catholicism was hierarchic and monarchic; so, in its own way, was 
authoritarian and centralizing Jacobinism. Whatever the rivalry 
between the two, the mindset both promoted was intransigent and 
omnicompetent; the society it engendered would be "naturally 
oriented towards rival authoritarianisms". Which may be why 
"moderate" long remained a pejorative —especially in politics. 
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The cut and thrust of contending faiths invigorated both, and also 
made it easier to doubt either. How does this relate to that government 
of the sovereign people we call democracy? It means that the French 
believe in monarchy and have recreated it in their political system: the 
people is sovereign, but power is exercized top down, not bottom up. 
They also believe in resisting authority energetically, which they do 
sporadically all the time. As Alain put it, to think is to say no. The 
French think a lot, and one of their conclusions is that dissent attracts 
more attention than chiming in with everybody else. 
As nay-sayings and their rationalizations piled up, French political 
memory became less historical than geological. Successive 
eschatologies did not nudge each other out of court; they lived on, one 
superimposed on another, until Jacobinism, Socialism and 
Communism (long used indifferently), Anarchism and Monarchisms 
became harder to tell apart. Then, in the 1870s, after several 
revolutions and seven different regimes over four score years, it was 
detennined that the republican system least divided the French. And 
still the French remain divided. 
"So it was, then, that France turned away from liberalism", begins 
Birnbaum's chapter devoted to the difficulties which prevent that 
creed from taking root in France. It is not clear that there was much to 
turn from; but Birnbaum is right to stress its failure to catch on. In the 
plebiscite of daily life, the French accepted the nation, but not their 
foes' version of it. The cult of ancestors involved the cultivation of 
their hatreds too. Liberal polities supposed disagreement taken in 
good part: civil debate, courteous contention, blunted loggerheads. 
That was not how tilings turned out whilst, for a long time, democracy 
remained no more than a gleam in the eyes of believers; then, 
evolving, came to look more like bureaucracy tempered by bungling. 
Voltaire compared democratic republicanism to a dragon with 
several heads and several tails: the heads, he said, get in each other's 
way, the tails obey a single head that tries to devour all. In republic as 
in monarchy, the devouring head was the state: autocratic, 
centralizing, omnicompetent. Everything began and ended in its 
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bureaux, everything does so still; and the men and women who serve 
it, elected officials, magistrates, high civil servants, are the new 
nobility, their symbiotic relation with the state crucial. 
High bureaucrats who combine authority and probity long 
represented durable professionalism in a fickle political jungle. 
Austere, aloof, credited with the economic miracle that turned the 
economy around after 1945, they projected the image of a state that 
was neutral, cold, responsible and efficient, a model of continuity 
amid incoherence. Trained in elite grandes ecoles and especially in 
the grandest, the ENA and the Polytechnique, they belong to an old 
boy network whose members rise and revolve through the seats of 
power. And despite denunciations of ENA graduates as an elitist 
nomenklatura, all four candidates in the 1995 presidential elections, 
not least the present President, were enarques. 
Unfortunately, the technocratic elite and their "society of 
connivance", are blotting their copybooks. Situated as they are at the 
lucrative interface between state enterprise and private profit, 
corruption, favoritism, grubby grazing on public enterprises, slush 
funds and stock options are bringing public officials closer to the 
spoils system from which they stood apart. Most of the French look 
upon their political representatives as corrupt. But politicians have 
been discredited so long that it no longer matters; scapegoats of 
ambient populism, meritocrats now follow in their wake. 
Yet they continue more respected, or more intimidating, than other 
civic figures. Competent, articulate and unaccountable, these earnest, 
vain, highly-trained achievers set the country's standards still; and the 
state they run proves not only resilient, but insistently dominant. It 
owns the post office, the rail system, the Paris airports, the gas, 
electricity and nuclear industries, most of Air France and the 
telephone service; and it accounts for a quarter of the workforce and 
one third of the industrial output. Yet a growing proportion of the 
French (53% in 1994) think that the state does not intervene enough in 
economic life. So much for democracy. 
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Identification with a new-model nation where everyone was 
supposed to be free and equal proved laborious too. The France of 
1789, and even that of mid-19th century, was a congeries of mostly 
local identities preserved by particular privileges, cultural references 
and kinds of speech. Incongruous regions, insular peasants (potatoes, 
Marx called them, in a sack of potatoes) mostly illiterate, had to be 
civilized, nationalized, homogenized, Frenchified. "France must cease 
to be a tower of Babel", proclaimed one revolutionary progressive. 
Heterogenous identities and forms of speech foreign to each other had 
to be "exterminated" so that the national body should live. Henceforth 
equal as citizens, Bretons, Basques, Alsatians, Jews, Flemings, should 
be taught and leam to speak French, to be French and only French. 
That program of emancipation fills Birnbaum with indignation. 
"The furious campaign of assimilation", he writes, "reproduced the 
intolerance of an earlier age... regeneration... was symbolized by the 
eclipse of the Jews" who were made to disappear "behind their new 
dignity as citizens". Historian of Jewish Destinies and other works 
about the state of Jews in France, Birnbaum has honed his view of 
ethnic quandaries on antisemitism, and he treats what was for its time 
a deliverance as a tyrannical imposition. The fact is that the abbé 
Grégoire, cited as a major advocate of assimilation, was a friend and 
champion of Jews (and of Blacks). Few beside Grégoire gave much 
thought, even hostile thought, to Jews who were admitted to civil 
rights along with other groups that had been deprived of them until 
then; and Frenchifying Jews proved quicker and easier than 
Frenchifying peasants —mainly because most Jews welcomed 
assimilation. The peasants, meanwhile, without access to press, maps, 
imagery or, until the 19th century, to schools, found it hard to 
conceive the unfamiliar abstraction, France, let alone to speak its 
language. They have learnt it by now, and it includes the rhetoric, the 
demonstrations, and the forceful forms of self-affirmation common to 
public life. 
Church and State, meanwhile, once at loggerheads, have learned to 
tolerate each other. And, for most French, differences that once set 
them apart have become irrelevant. By 1994, 72% of the French did 
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not believe that mere was one single true religion, 7 1 % thought that 
everyone must define their own religion independently of churches, 
less than 30% believed in God, only 19% in the Devil —fewer than 
believe in astrology, telepathy, spiritualism and parascience. Religious 
identities now look to be both partial and plural. Catholicism à la 
carte has comfortably adjusted to what Birnbaum calls "modalities of 
belief. And there's the beginning of an answer to one of Bimbaum's 
opening questions: can the French learn to live with the challenges of 
multiculturalism and diversity? They are doing so, but à la française. 
Jews, for example, are now only one minority among others. An 
officiai poll of 1978 recorded 9% doubting that French Jews were 
really French; but 11% believed that Corsicans were not really French 
either, 8% felt the same about Alsatians, 4% about Bretons. A few 
years later, 12% believed that there were too many Jews in France; but 
16% thought that there were too many Spaniards, and 50% felt that 
there were too many foreigners in general. In 1997, Le Pen's National 
Front garnered 15% of the vote by openly declaring itself to be racist. 
Thirty per cent of employed workers voted in favor of its xenophobic 
populism. And now two thirds of French adults believe that there are 
too many Arabs in France. In this perspective, Jews are less 
exceptional than sometimes presented or self-presented; especially 
when another official poll, in 1999, found two fifths of respondents 
declaring themselves racists. So the fact that some French do not 
particularly like Jews seems less relevant, when the French do not 
particularly like anybody. 
Large and underpopulated by European standards, modern France 
has always been a country of immigration. Bled white of working 
males by the First World War, it became more so. By die 1920s, the 
foreigners it sheltered and employed —Italians, Poles, Belgians, 
Armenians— accounted for 7% of the population compared to 6% 
today. In 1930 the immigration rate was higher than North America's. 
In the 1960s the immigrant flow resumed, mostly from Spain, 
Portugal, Yugoslavia and, especially, North Africa. The children of 
those immigrants are now French citizens. But are they French? Or 
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merely the sediment of an invasion contaminating national identity, as 
the National Front contends aloud and others sotto voce? 
Today, multiculturalism and opposition to it are mainly viewed in 
relation to the substantial Muslim presence, and to its concentration in 
suburbs that, in the name of ethnic and religious difference, become 
virtual Muslim enclaves. But it is not yet clear how a nation can 
subsist as a nation while sharing loyalties with some other nation or 
with several. Nor is it clear how a cultural identity can survive the 
siren calls of multiple rival cultures. Coiiflicting loyalties, multiple 
allegiances, pose problems that good intentions prefer to ignore. And 
yet we know that national identities were themselves crafted, not 
immaculately conceived. Perhaps as identitarian enterprises evolve 
and multiply, participants will become not more different but more 
indifferent. And indifference is the best guarantee of tolerance. 
Are the French, then, learning to live with the challenges of 
multiculturalism, as Birnbaum began by asking? And (to quote his 
preface) will the new idea of France bring forth a society that 
welcomes foreigners and respects differences? Much depends on 
whether the insensitive masses will come to share the sensibilities of 
their politically correct betters. They certainly accepted with 
enthusiasm the multicolored team that won the World Football Cup in 
1998 —the most ethnically diverse of all competing countries and 
heavily loaded with North Africans. But where does this hopeful 
metaphor for national harmony leave multiculturalism, when the 
heady exaltation wanes? Writing in the late 1990s (his book came out 
in 1998), Birnbaum credited Britain with a less confrontational, more 
decentralized and welcoming public sphere that affords greater 
political and cultural autonomy to Asian immigrants than the French 
afford their own. Recent tensions and race riots in many parts of 
England show up this wishful thinking. Nor could Birnbaum guess 
that, in October 2001, the first ever Franco-Algerian football match 
would end when, in the 74th minute of play, with France leading 4-1, 
hundreds of young Algerians (who, having grown up near die Seine, 
ignored the words of the Algerian anthem but copiously booed the 
Marseillaise) surged onto the ground and stopped the game. 
[MyC, 6,2003,141-151] 
150 Eugen Weber 
The British, like the French, know that most of their problems are 
caused by one another; but the French, like the British, find blaming 
others more consoling. Mutual mistrust, competing prejudices, rival 
rigidities, ghettoes meant to avoid friction but better at generating it, 
are only some of the reefs on which diversity can founder. If societies 
define themselves by what they reject, present French rejection of 
"Americanism" reflects long-standing scorn for materialism, 
commercialism, massification; perhaps for modernity too. And current 
multicultural pieties also come under suspicion because they appear 
tarred with an American brush. Nearly two thirds of the French find 
American cultural influence too great; more than two thirds worry 
about hubristic American hyperpower. And now they need to worry 
about a Texan winning the tour de France too many times in a row. 
Yet the state —"that great fictitious entity by which everyone 
seeks to live at the expense of everyone else"— the state still giveth 
and the state taketh away. Large French companies are enterprising, 
creative and profitable. Labor productivity is high, but businesses do 
not employ a lot of people. Competitive advantages are eroded by 
regulations, and a wasp 's nest of taxes accounts for 45% of gross 
national product. Public spending crowds out private spending, 
hobbles job creation, costs big firms money and discourages small 
ones. The 35-hours week doesn't help much either. The economy is 
ill-flexible, the labor market is sticky, high taxes for social security 
and high penalties for layoffs discourage hiring, protract structural 
unemployment, and keep a quarter of the work force on 
unemployment benefits or subsidized jobs. The Ministry of Labor 
affirms its preference for quality employment over the low-paying 
sort. Distrust of the American model discourages any admission that 
McJobs could lower unemployment, raise growth and save taxpayers 
some of the hard-earned cash they pay in taxes. No wonder that the 
French consume more tranquilizers, sleeping pills and antidepressants 
than any other people in the world. 
This is not what troubles Birnbaum, who does not mention it. What 
bothers him is the excess of "gentle tranquility", the "unexpected 
triumph of a passionless consensus", the "banalization", of once-
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dramatic politics. The passions of a distant past have been 
extinguished, the enmities that stoked their fires are passées, even the 
boredom that sparked rebelliousness into the 1960s is missing. 
Birnbaum seems to agree with François Furet that France has closed 
its political theatre of the exceptional, and become a democracy like 
any other. Or perhaps not. 
Now that common descent, language, culture, historical memories 
are in shorter supply, Society, "a crowd of individuals alike in their 
desire not to resemble one another", is supplanting the Nation. And 
still the French State soldiers on, "a model (as one interior minister 
declared) not only for France but for the world". Integration and 
assimilation lurch ahead, and so do distinctive ethnic identities. As 
state-subsidized schools strive to revive regional speech, the time 
when ambitious revolutionaries vowed to destroy dialects seems far 
away. Prestigious business schools offer bilingual courses in English 
as well as French. Nevertheless, the Gallic cock has not ceased to 
affirm the radiance of national culture while clucking about its relative 
decline. The political opposition of dextrism and sinistrism appears 
increasingly formal, but generational, professional and economic 
conflicts continue divisive. Consensus is not so passionless as to 
discourage confrontation. Disgruntled farmers, postmen, teachers, 
public transport workers, medical personnel, schoolchildren, women, 
pensioners and telephone workers take to the streets, jam traffic and 
complicate life, evoking timid reserve or, more often, approval. 
Strikes are the national sport: however disruptive, few will criticize 
them. 
So things have been changing, but nothing much has changed. 
Birnbaum sighs over an impotent state (really?), corrupt elites (what 
else is new?), and Scotch supplanting Pernod. If I were he, however, I 
wouldn't worry much about the end of French exceptionalism. Time 
will tell. But time, who is an honest judge, (Tocqueville said that too), 
always arrives, alas, too late. 
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